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ABSTRACT
High-performance and safety-critical system architects
must accurately evaluate the application-level silent data
corruption (SDC) rates of processors to soft errors. Such
an evaluation requires error propagation all the way from
particle strikes on low-level state up to the program out-
put. Existing approaches that rely on low-level simula-
tions with fault injection cannot evaluate full applications
because of their slow speeds, while application-level accel-
erated fault testing in accelerated particle beams is often
impractical. We present a new two-level methodology
for application resilience evaluation that overcomes these
challenges. The proposed approach decomposes appli-
cation failure rate estimation into: (1) identifying how
particle strikes in low-level unprotected state manifest
at the architecture-level, and (2) measuring how such
architecture-level manifestations propagate to the pro-
gram output. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach on GPU architectures. We also show that using
just one of the two steps can overestimate SDC rates and
produce different trends—the composition of the two is
needed for accurate reliability modeling.
1. INTRODUCTION
Transient hardware faults caused by high-energy parti-
cle strikes are of rising concern for processors deployed in
high-performance computing systems and safety-critical
embedded systems. These transient faults can propa-
gate to the application level and cause execution failures,
also known as Detected Unrecoverable Errors (DUEs),
or worse they can silently corrupt the application output
and lead to Silent Data Corruption (SDC).
The SDC rate of a system is fundamentally archi-
tecture and application dependent. Despite this cross-
layer complexity, system and software architects for high-
performance or safety-critical systems must ensure that
the applications running on their systems achieve accept-
able SDC rates. Furthermore, software developers also
want to gain insight into why their applications produce
certain SDC rates, if these rates are unacceptable, and
how to ensure that their applications are reliable with
minimal impact on performance and power.
These objectives necessitate a fast and accurate re-
silience evaluation technique. Quantifying how particle
strikes in unprotected low-level state propagate to the
application output requires a detailed design such that
transient bit-flips in unprotected structures can accurately
be injected or modeled and a fast evaluation framework
that propagates such low-level errors all the way to the
program output, and not just to the output of a chip or
a kernel. Meeting these conflicting requirements makes
application SDC rate estimation challenging.
Existing approaches are insufficient to investigate app-
lication-level resilience at the level of detail required to
enable software architects to quantify the SDC rates of
their applications and to develop insights into what makes
their applications vulnerable—insights that are key for
developing low-cost resilience solutions. We categorize
existing approaches into five following groups. Table 1
compares these approaches based on their speed, accu-
racy, complexity, and visibility into the application state
corruption.
• Low-level simulation-based fault injection uses
either an RTL-level or microarchitecture-level simulator
to inject faults by flipping bits in low-level state [1, 2].
The accuracy of this approach is limited by the fidelity
of its model—RTL is very accurate, microarchitecture
simulators less so—and it can only study the impact
of faults at the architecture- or chip-level due to slow
simulation speed. Since error manifestations at these
levels may not propagate to the application output, full-
application analysis is impractical with this approach.
FPGA-based simulations [3, 4, 5] are faster but they
suffer from high implementation complexity, limited
visibility into application-level error propagation, and
limited availability of FPGAs that can fit chip designs
that contain 10s of billions of transistors.
• Higher-level simulation-based fault injection ei-
ther injects faults at the architecture-level or into
compiler-level intermediate representations [6, 7, 8,
9, 10]. This approach is fast and provides visibility into
application corruption. The error modeling accuracy,
however, depends entirely on the chosen model, and it
is often limited to injecting single bit-flips uniformly
at the instruction-level.
• Hierarchical fault simulations integrate low- and
higher-level simulators such that only the required
details are modeled at the low-level to accurately inject
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Table 1: A comparison of the various techniques for deriving application-level SDC rates.
Low-level fault simulation Higher-
level fault
injection
Hierarchical
fault
simulations
Microarchi-
tecture-
level ACE
analysis
Accelerated
fault
testing
Our
approach
RTL FPGA-
based
Captures application-level error
propagation
No Yes Yes Yes Somewhat Yes Yes
Visibility into application state
corruption
Low Moderate High High Moderate Low High
Fault model accuracy High High Low High Depends on
the model
High High
Speed Slow Medium Fast Medium Medium Fast Fast
Implementation complexity Medium High Low High High Low Low
the fault. Once the error manifests at the higher-level,
the faster simulator takes over [11, 12, 13]. While this
approach is much faster than low-level simulations, the
integration complexity makes it impractical for large
systems.
• Microarchitecture-level analysis attempts to iden-
tify which values in microarchitecture structures can
possibly affect correct program execution (also known
as ACE analysis) [14, 15, 16, 17]. This analysis only
covers structures whose occupancy can be reasoned
about (e.g., large SRAM structures). As these ap-
proaches typically rely on simulation to characterize
occupancy, examining full applications is prohibitively
expensive.
• Accelerated fault testing subjects an existing chip
to a high-energy particle beam and measures the ob-
served chip error and failure rates [18, 19]. While this
approach simulates the long-term behavior of comput-
ing systems and can be performed on full applications
at speed, it does not allow for controlled injection or
the detailed observability of errors. It also does not
provide any insight into the vulnerability of low-level
structures.
To enable fast, accurate, and flexible application-level
error analysis, we propose a novel two-level technique that
decomposes application failure rate estimation into two
decoupled components: (1) identifying and modeling how
particle strikes in low-level unprotected state manifest
at the architecture-level, and (2) measuring how such
architectural manifestations propagate to the program
output. In this paper, we develop tools that enable this
approach to be applied to the NVIDIA GPUs.
For the first step, we employ accelerated neutron beam
testing using carefully crafted test programs on existing
silicon as this methodology offers realistic fault models
for accurate failure rate estimates. Each test program
repeatedly executes a specific instruction type and cap-
tures architecture-level error manifestation rate from the
particle strikes in unprotected structures (latches, flip-
flops, and SRAMs) of the systolic instruction execution
pipelines. For throughput oriented processors such as
GPUs, such structures are expected to be the biggest
contributor to SDCs (our results also support this ex-
pectation) [20, 21]. While beam experiments are subject
to statistical uncertainty, they eliminate the modeling
inaccuracies that arise in simulation-based approaches.
Capturing architecture-level error manifestations after
every instruction is challenging as the error checking and
recording logic after every instruction can be prohibitive.
We address this challenge and present methods to prepare
tests for different instruction types. We call this step
Implementation-level Propagation Analysis (IPA).
The second step employs fast error injection into the
architectural state of a program running on existing hard-
ware and measures how these errors propagate to the
program output. This propagation is a function of the
program itself rather than the microarchitecture it runs
on. For our GPU case study, we employed SASSIFI
that instruments a CUDA program with code that can
flip bits in low-level GPU assembly instruction (SASS)
outputs [6]. As SASSIFI runs directly on the GPU, it
is orders of magnitude faster than detailed simulators
and can use unmodified applications. We call this step
Architecture-level Propagation Analysis (APA).
In the final step, we estimate an application’s SDC
rate by combining the results from IPA and APA along
with application- and device-specific performance metrics.
The following are the contributions of this paper.
• A two-level methodology to estimate SDC rates that
is faster than low-level simulation-based approaches,
more accurate than higher-level simulations, and more
flexible than accelerated application fault testing. This
approach requires performing IPA experiments just
once per GPU generation and fast APA experiments per
application to derive application SDC rate estimates
on a target GPU.
• We quantify how particle strikes in low-level unpro-
tected structures of state-of-the-art GPUs manifest
at the architecture-level using accelerated beam ex-
periments. We address the challenge of capturing
architecture-level error manifestations after every SASS
instruction with minimal error checking and recording
logic (by introducing it only after a long sequence of
target SASS instruction).
• We estimate SDC rates of all workloads from the Ro-
dinia benchmark suite [22] and two DOE mini-apps
(CoMD [23] and Lulesh [24]). We compare these esti-
mates to direct beam test results for a selected set of
workloads.
• We present insights into how IPA- or APA-only ap-
proaches can provide inaccurate SDC rates and trends.
They overestimate SDC rates and show different trends—
the composition of the two is needed for accurate relia-
bility modeling.
Application-level 
(program output) 
Architecture-level 
(instruction visible state) 
Low-level 
(latches, flip-flops, SRAMs, logic) 
Implementation-level 
Propagation Analysis 
(IPA) 
Application  
Failure Rate 
Architecture-level 
Propagation Analysis 
(APA) 
Figure 1: Composing low-level and architecture-level
error propagation analyses to estimate application-level
failure rate. The red symbols represent faults/errors at
different levels of the design hierarchy.
2. OVERVIEW
Considering the need for a fast, accurate, and flexible
application resilience analysis and the challenges asso-
ciated with prior solutions (as discussed above and in
Table 1), we propose a two-level application failure rate
evaluation methodology that accounts for both low-level
and program-level error propagation. The first step, IPA,
evaluates how particle strikes in unprotected structures
manifest as changes to the architecture-level state. The
second step, APA, evaluates how such manifestations
propagate to the program output. As a final step, we
combine the results from these two steps along with sim-
ple application- and device-specific metrics to estimate
application SDC rate. This rate is expressed as Fail-
ures In Time (FIT), where one FIT equals one failure
in a billion hours. Figure 1 summarizes our approach.
While this approach can be applied to any processor, we
demonstrate it on NVIDIA GPUs.
2.1 Error Model to Bridge IPA and APA
We bridge IPA and APA with an architecture-level er-
ror model that captures bit-flips in low-level unprotected
structures as bit-flips in assembly (SASS) instruction
outputs. The bit-flips in low-level state can manifest
in different ways at the architecture-level and the mani-
festation rate depends on which low-level bit is flipped.
Figure 2 summarizes how we categorize low-level bits.
The vulnerability of a low-level bit is either dependent
or independent of the instruction type that is executing.
We call the bits whose vulnerability depends on the in-
struction that is executing as D-bits and the ones that do
not as I-bits. For example, bits in ALU are categorized as
D-bits and bits in structures that mediate communication
between CPU and GPU are categorized as I-bits.
Vulnerability of a 
low-level bit 
Dependent on instruction 
type (D-bit) 
Fixed vulnerability per 
instruction type (F-bit) 
Variable vulnerability per 
instruction type (V-bit) 
Independent of the 
instruction type (I-bit) 
Affects some instructions   
(IS-bit) 
Affects many instructions 
(IM-bit) 
Figure 2: Categorizing low-level bits.
D-bits: Vulnerability of a D-bit can either be fixed
or variable per instruction type. We call the D-bits whose
vulnerability is fixed per instruction type as F-bits. FIT
rate of these bits scales linearly with instruction issue
rate. Examples of F-bits include flip-flops and SRAM
bits in buffers in systolic pipeline stages. Since GPUs
consist of simple in-order pipelines, bit-flips in F-bits
mostly manifest as bit-flips in the destination register of
one instruction in one thread.
We call the D-bits whose vulnerability varies with
different microarchitecture-level buffer occupancies per
instruction type as V-bits. FIT rate of these bits scales
with instruction issue rate as well as other performance
metrics. Examples of V-bits include unprotected SRAM
bits in data caches, load/store buffers, and DRAM buffers.
Since data can reside in these structures for a variable
amount of time, the vulnerability of such bits will also
vary.
Bit-flips in V-bits can manifest as DUEs or bit-flips in
destination registers of instructions. For example, a bit-
flip in an unprotected load buffer entry can only corrupt
one instruction’s output in just one thread. The size of
the corruption (number of bit-flips) depends on whether
the data or address bit was flipped. A bit-flip in an
unprotected buffer between L2 and L1 data caches while
the data is being transferred from L2 to L1 cache can
manifest as a bit-flip in a cache line in L1 cache. If the
cache line has only one reuse, the corruption may affect
the destination registers of only one instruction. If the
line has several uses, destination registers of multiple
instructions in multiple threads in multiple warps can be
corrupted.
I-bits: We categorize I-bits further based on the
number of instructions that could be corrupted by the
underlying bit-flip. We call the I-bits that corrupt only
some instructions as IS-bits and the bits that corrupt
many instructions as IM-bits. For example, a bit-flip
in an unprotected instruction buffer in the front-end of
the pipeline can corrupt the destination registers of all
the threads in one warp (due to the SIMT nature of the
GPUs). If the corrupted instruction is used by multiple
warps then it can corrupt multiple warps. The number of
instructions corrupted by this bit are, however, limited.
So we call it an IS-bit. We categorize the bits that are
not directly used for a specific instruction’s execution,
but are needed for correct functioning of the GPU as
IM-bits. One example of such bits is a bit in a structure
used to mediate communication between CPU and GPU.
A bit-flip in it can corrupt many data words and manifest
in many instructions during execution.
In this paper, we focus on modeling the impact of bit-
flips in the F-bits. Our IPA results, as discussed later
in Section 6.1 indicate that the F-bits are the primary
sources of the SDCs. We also show the potential impact
of bit-flips in the V-, IS-, and IM-bits.
We model architectural manifestations from bit-flips
in F-bits using a per-instruction-type architecture-level
model. For example, a particle strike in a pipeline latch
while an integer add instruction is executing can propa-
gate to the destination (output) register value and corrupt
just one bit location. We capture this as a single bit-flip
in the destination register of the integer add instruction.
We also capture the manifestations from a single event
per instruction type as (1) multiple bit-flips in the des-
tination register of one instruction, and (2) single and
multiple bit-flips in the destination registers of one in-
struction that spans multiple threads in a warp. These
error outcomes stem from our observations from IPA
experiments, as discussed in Section 6.1. We use this
categorization later to conduct APA experiments.
2.2 IPA
IPA can be performed in multiple ways to capture
such architecture-level manifestations. Accelerated high-
energy neutron beam testing using state-of-the-art GPUs,
low-level (RTL) error injection based studies, and ACE
analysis using detailed microarchitecture-level simulators
are three such ways. While the latter two approaches
can be performed in pre-silicon stages, the availability of
the detailed simulation infrastructure, simulation speeds,
or design complexity often become the limiting factors.
We chose the first approach because (1) the phenomenon
that induces errors is closest to the natural occurrences
of soft errors, (2) we do not have modeling inaccuracies
that simulation based approaches suffer, and (3) we do
not require detailed low-level simulators. For the beam
testing, we designed workloads that repeatedly execute
a specific instruction per workload and capture manifes-
tations in the outputs of each instruction. The output
of this analysis is a set of error propagation rates for
different manifestations (e.g., single- or double-bit flips in
one destination register) for each instruction type. The
manifestation may also be a program crash or hang.
2.3 APA
APA can be performed in a couple of ways such as dy-
namic program-level liveness analysis or software-based
instruction-level error injection. We choose the second
approach primarily because it can precisely measure
program-level error propagation (across multiple kernels
in case of GPU programs) to the output. For this step, we
employ a fast instruction-level error injection tool called
SASSIFI that can inject into workloads running at-scale
directly on the silicon [6]. For all the error manifestations
observed in IPA, we perform statistical error injection
campaigns per instruction type for all our workloads and
obtain application-output level propagation probabilities.
2.4 Composing IPA and APA to Estimate SDC
Rate
We estimate application-level failure rates by com-
posing the results from the IPA and APA with per-
application dynamic instruction distributions and device-
specific performance metrics. We compute FIT rates for
both SDCs and DUEs, but focus on SDCs. We use the
Equation 1 to compute the per-application SDC FIT rate
for F-bits. This equation essentially multiplies the rate of
manifestation of an incorrect architecture state (IAS) per
instruction type, obtained during IPA, with the probabil-
ity of a SDC given such architecture-level manifestation
obtained during APA. It factors the instruction distribu-
tion of the application. This result is then scaled with
the application’s instruction issue rate on the specific
device for F-bits to account to obtain the application FIT
rate (lower the issue rate, the lower the SDC rate if other
parameters do not change). Per instruction type issue
rate might result in a more accurate estimate, but is hard
to obtain on silicon. This formulation can be used for V-
and I-bits as well, but the scaling factor will depend on
other performance metrics.
FITSDC = (
N∑
n=1
fn × (
M∑
m=1
pIASnm × pSDCnm))× s
(1)
where
N = number of instruction types in an application
fn = fraction of application instructions of type n
M = number of architectural error manifestations, includ-
ing bit flip patterns
pIASnm = rate of incorrect architectural state for a spe-
cific manifestation m for instruction type n
pSDCnm = probability that the manifestation m in in-
struction type n will result in an application-level SDC
s = application and device specific scaling factor (is-
sueIPC in this study)
We obtain pIASnm values during IPA and pSDCnm
during APA. For the IAS that are crashes and hangs,
pSDCnm = 0. We obtain fn and s through dynamic
application profiling.
3. IPA METHODOLOGY
The goal of IPA is to address two key questions. (1) How
do low-level errors in state-of-the-art GPUs manifest at
the outputs of the executing instructions? For exam-
ple, do particle strikes in unprotected flip-flops, latches,
and SRAMs propagate as single or multiple bit flips in
destination registers? Do they corrupt single or multi-
ple instructions? How many threads do they corrupt?
(2) What are the rates for different instruction-level error
manifestations?
Focusing on F-bits, our approach is to capture archi-
tecture-level manifestations after each instruction while
running microbenchmarks on GPUs in an accelerated
high-energy neutron beam. We develop a microbench-
mark suite targeting seven commonly used SASS instruc-
tions. These instructions constitute nearly half of the dy-
namic instruction count in our workloads (see Section 6.2
for details). We expect the vulnerability from F-bits to be
significant for these instructions. Each microbenchmark
captures the architecture-level manifestations of particle
strikes in low-level state after virtually every instruction
execution. We manually attribute the observed events
to F-, V-, IS-, or IM-bits. This approach provides us an
estimate of the relative contribution of different types
of bits to SDCs. It allows us to measure the rates for
different instruction output manifestations (e.g., single
or multiple bit flips or random values in one or multiple
instructions in one or multiple threads) for the different
SASS instructions.
3.1 Microbenchmark Suite to Quantify Archi-
tecture-level Error Manifestations
The challenging part in developing such microbench-
marks is to capture all instruction-level manifestations
while ensuring that the checking and recording code does
not significantly perturb normal execution sequence of
the instruction under test. The key insight we use to
overcome this challenge for arithmetic instructions is to
accumulate values produced by instructions into an accu-
mulator register. We preserve the destination registers of
all the instructions until we compare the accumulator’s
value to a predetermined constant to check for error man-
ifestations. If the comparison fails then we write all the
register values to host pinned memory. This allows us to
identify which instruction(s) observe the manifestation
and which propagate the manifested corruption. Since
the number of available registers per thread is limited,
we need to perform the check after a certain number of
back-to-back arithmetic operations. Based on the per-
thread register availability, this approach allows us to
keep the checking code and recording code to <10% for
our microbenchmarks.
We test with ECC on, which means the register file,
L1 and L2 caches, shared memory, and DRAM are pro-
tected from single-bit flips. We record but ignore un-
corrected ECC errors in this study. We develop seven
microbenchmarks that target the seven commonly used
SASS instructions based on dynamic instruction profile of
the workloads from the Rodinia benchmark suite: IADD,
FADD, IMAD, FFMA, LDS, ISETP, and BRA [25]. This
mix contains integer, floating point, shared memory load,
and control instructions. For each target instruction, we
write a CUDA kernel such that the targeted instruction
executes repeatedly to dominate the total runtime. These
programs have almost no control and memory divergence.
For the most part, the threads operate completely out of
the register file and do not use the memory subsystem
(except for the I-caches).
Arithmetic Instructions: For the IADD kernel, we
first initialize the register content and then execute a long
sequence of IADD instructions that executes a Fibonacci
series. After the series, which is about 45 instructions
long in our setup, we compare the final value with the
expected value. If a mismatch is detected, we store all the
register values (outputs of each of the instructions that are
part of the Fibonacci series) to host memory to be logged
by the host for post-processing. Figure 3 shows the main
section of this program. We prepared programs for the
other arithmetic instructions (FADD, IMAD, and FFMA)
using a similar approach, i.e., accumulating values from
a sequence of instructions to reduce interference from the
checking and recording code. This approach allows us
to map the every manifestation back to the instruction
where it originated and how it manifested (in one or
multiple instructions).
      MOV32I R12, 0x1;    // Initial value 
.LOOP_BEGIN: 
      IADD R13, R12, 0x2;    // Series of add instructions 
      IADD R14, R12, 0x4; 
      IADD R15, R13, R14; 
      IADD R16, R14, R15; 
      . 
      . 
      IADD R58, R56, R57; 
      IADD R59, R57, R58;    // Final accumulated value 
      // Check the final result with expected value 
      ISETP.NE.AND P0, PT, R59, c[0x2][0x0], PT;    
  @P0 BRA .LOG_INFO;         // Branch out in case of a mismatch 
      IADD R10, R10, 0x1;    // Loop index variable 
      ISETP.LT.AND P0, PT, R10, c[0x0][0x150], PT; 
  @P0 BRA .LOOP_BEGIN; 
.LOG_INFO:     // Log info to host-pinned memory 
      . 
      . 
      ST.E [R6+0xf58], R10;  // Store loop index variable 
      ST.E [R8+0x8], R12;    // Store all register values 
      ST.E [R8+0x10], R13; 
      . 
      . 
      ST.E [R8+0xc8], R59; 
Figure 3: The main section of the microbenchmark
that tests how particle strikes in IADD manifest at the
architecture-level.
Compare Instruction: An ISETP instruction com-
pares the input operand registers and writes the one-bit
result into a predicate register. There are seven one-bit
predicate registers in the Kepler ISA (our target GPU
is Kepler-based) [25]. Our ISETP kernel also contains
a long loop that executes a sequence of ISETP instruc-
tions with a few other instructions. We hand-modify the
body of this loop such that we execute seven back-to-
back ISETP instructions (that write to different predicate
registers) followed by a P2R instruction;1 this moves all
seven predicate bits (along with condition codes) into
a general purpose register. We accumulate the value of
these general purpose registers, similar to our IADD ker-
nel, and move them to host memory if the accumulated
value does not match the expected value. This provides
us the ability to map every manifestation back to the
instruction where the error would have originated. We
can also identify if multiple instructions in one or mul-
tiple threads manifest at a similar time. Through this
approach we may attribute an error in the P2R instruc-
tion as an error in the ISETP instruction, which is one
of the limitations.
Branch Instruction: For the BRA program, we
write a chain of branch instructions such that the target
of each branch instruction is another branch instruction.
We separate these instructions by tens of instructions
and insert filler branch instructions that jump to a record
routine and terminate program. These filler branch in-
structions do not execute on a fault-free run. We execute
these chained branch instruction in a loop that termi-
nates after a certain number of iterations. The record
routine logs the loop index variable and allows us to de-
tect whether the loop terminated early. An error in the
executing branch instruction can result in the following
three events. (1) Control transfer to a filler instruction:
1We use non-publicly available tools to generate and assemble
this hand-modified SASS code.
The designed program will terminate early (without com-
pleting predetermined loop iterations) and record the loop
index variable for post-processing. (2) Control transfer to
outside the program: Program crashes in these cases. (3)
Control transfers to non-filler instructions: Some of these
errors can go undetected and we reduce this probability
by limiting non-filler instructions.
Shared Memory Load Instruction: For the loads
from shared memory (LDS), we first write known values
to the all the shared memory locations. We load them to
different registers in a loop iteration. We accumulate the
values into an accumulator, using a similar concept as
in IADD program above, and record the register content
for later inspection if the accumulator does not match
its expected value. In this program we can distinguish
whether the IADD or the LDS instruction noticed the
error as the IADD instructions should only corrupt the
accumulator not the individual register. The data in
shared memory is protected by ECC from direct particle
strikes.
3.2 Beam Experiments
We conducted the beam experiments to quantify archi-
tectural manifestations for the arithmetic and compare
instructions (IADD, IMAD, FADD, FFMA, and ISETP)
at the ISIS facility near Oxford, United Kingdom and for
the branch and shared memory load instructions (BRA
and LDS) at the LANSCE facility at Los Alamos, New
Mexico using NVIDIA K40 Tesla GPUs [26]. Figure 4
shows the K40 board and the accompanying hardware
in the beam experiment room on the first day of test-
ing at ISIS. The neutron flux at these facilities is 4-7
orders of magnitude higher than the flux at sea level. We
adjusted the microbenchmark runtimes (using loop itera-
tion counts) such that the probability of observing only
one architectural-visible error (crash or value corruption)
due to a particle strike is high. This allow us to scale
accelerated beam test results to realistic environments.
We calibrate the FIT rates obtained from different beam
testing facilities based on a common test with known FIT
rate.
The K40 board includes a Kepler architecture based
GK110b GPU chip and 12 GB GDDR5 [27]. We irra-
diated just the GPU chip. The chip is fabricated us-
ing 28nm planar bulk technology from TSMC and in-
cludes 15 Streaming Multiprocessors (SMs), up to 2048
threads/SM, 30 Mbit total register file (RF), 7.86 Mbit
total L1 cache/Shared memory, 12 Mbit L2 cache. The
register files, shared memory, caches, and DRAM are
ECC protected and we run with ECC on.
We compute the FIT rate per architectural manifesta-
tion per instruction using fluence (total number of high-
energy neutrons), event counts, and New York City-level
flux (13 neutrons/cm2/hour [28]). In this paper, we only
show relative FIT rates. We conducted tests over several
days with an effective beam time of over fifteen hours
with a single GPU for these tests. The total beam usage
time was higher, considering the setup and down time.
The 95% confidence interval error bars for the FIT rate
Telsa K40 GPU 
Host System 
Figure 4: A picture of the experimental setup at the ISIS
beam testing facility.
per microbenchmark are [42%, -29%] for IADD, [49%,
-33%] for FADD, [42%, -29%] for IMAD, [38%, -27%] for
FFMA, [261%, -69%] for ISETP, [40%, -28%] for BRA,
and [58%, -36%] for LDS. The error bars are not tight
because we used only one GPU for this campaign (paral-
lel experiments with multiple GPUs can lower the error
bars significantly). We, however, observed a variety of
instruction-level manifestations including single, double,
3+ bit flips in one destination register in a single thread,
double and 3+ bit flips in one destination register across
the threads in a warp for different instruction types. The
results are shown in Section 6.
3.3 Event Categorization and Attribution
We run our microbenchmarks back-to-back while log-
ging state (using heartbeats) of each run at various points
in the program and recording any errors that are reported
by the program or system. If a program takes more than
3x its expected runtime, we terminate it and call the
event a hang. If the system becomes unresponsive, we
restart it. On every failure (crash or hang), we reset
the GPU (using nvidia-smi tool [29]) before continuing
with the next run. During program execution, we record
status messages before and after the GPU kernel and
flush the contents to a file, which help us to identify the
failures that occur during the GPU kernel execution.
If a failure occurs before the kernel starts, we attribute
it to a bit-flip in an IM-bit. If a hang is detected during
a kernel execution, we have visibility in diagnosing the
root cause, and cannot attribute the event to a low-level
bit type. If the kernel or program crashes during kernel
execution, we inspect the error code as reported by the
CUDA error handler or the Linux kernel log (which we
collect during LDS and BRA experiments) to attribute
the error to a particular bit type. We attribute the illegal-
instruction error to IS-bits because we hypothesize that a
bit-flip in an unprotected buffer while fetching the instruc-
tion results in such a manifestation. We attribute the
out-of-range errors and the stack errors (which occurred
only during the LDS and BRA experiments, respectively)
to F-bits.
On a program completion (without a crash or hang),
we inspect the recorded values and compare them to
the expected values. If all the values match, we assume
that either the loop control or checking logic in the mi-
crobenchmark is affected (not the targeted instructions),
which triggered the recording routine. We ignore such
events. On a value mismatch, we analyze the corruption
and categorize it as (1) single and (2) double bit-flips in
one instruction, (3) a random value error in one instruc-
tion, (4) a random value error in same instructions in
two threads, (5) double bit-flips in the same instruction
across all threads in one warp, (6) a random value error in
the same instruction across all threads in one warp, (7) a
zero value in the same instruction across all threads in
one warp, or (8) a random value error in two instructions
across all threads in two warps. As events 1-4 corrupt just
one instruction’s output in just one or two threads, we
hypothesize that the source of corruption to be a bit-flip
in a pipeline element. Hence, we attribute events 1-4 to
F-bits. We hypothesize that events 5-8 are caused by
bit-flips in the instruction(s) because they affect all of
the threads in a warp in a same way (GPUs are SIMT in
nature). Event 8 might be due to a multi-bit error that
spans multiple rows in an unprotected buffer. Based on
this hypothesis, we attribute events 5-8 to IS-bits.
4. APA METHODOLOGY
The second step in estimating an application’s SDC
FIT rate is to quantify how instruction output-level errors
propagate to the application output. We used SASSIFI
in this step to inject transient errors into ISA-visible state
such as general purpose registers, predicate registers, and
condition codes [6]. SASSIFI leverages the SASSI [30],
which provides the ability to instrument instructions in
the SASS code. SASSIFI injects instrumentation before
and after the instructions to identify injection sites and to
inject the error by modifying destination register values,
respectively.
SASSIFI operates in three main steps: (1) profiling
the application to identify possible error injection sites;
(2) statistically selecting error injection sites for each
error model; and (3) injecting errors into applications
based on the selected error model and monitoring the
resultant behavior. The error model is defined by the
IPA.
Profiling to Identify Error Injection Sites: In the
profiling step, SASSIFI collects names of static kernels
and the number of times they execute during a fault-free
application run to to identify the error injection space. It
also collects the number of dynamic instructions of each
opcode and instruction type per kernel invocation.
Since we have IPA results for seven instructions, we
group instructions that we expect will propagate bit-flips
in low-level state to the architecture-level similarly to the
ones we tested. We examine the Kepler ISA and mark the
instructions that operate solely on architectural registers
to be similar to either IADD, FADD, IMAD, FFMA, or
ISETP. We mark several control instructions to be similar
to BRA. Since instructions in a group are expected
to exercise similar low-level pipeline structures, their
inherent vulnerabilities should be strongly correlated.
As an example of these groupings, we place integer
maximum/minimum, shift operations, logical operations,
and float-to-integer instructions in the same group as
IADD. In this study, we group single and double pre-
cision floating-point operations together. Placing them
in different groups with associated IPA experiments will
improve the accuracy further.
Statistically Selecting Error Injection Sites: For
an architecture-level error model (from IPA) and the re-
spective instruction group, SASSIFI statistically selects
hundreds of dynamic instructions among all the dynamic
kernel executions as injection sites. An error injection
site is a tuple consisting of the instruction group ID,
architecture-level error model, static kernel name, dy-
namic kernel invocation ID, dynamic instruction count,
seed to randomly select a destination register, and seed
to select the error for injection based on the error model
(e.g., location of the bit flip for a single-bit flip model).
Error bars are under 3% at 95% confidence intervals
for our measured SDC probability per error model and
instruction type.
Error Injections Runs: We use the Instruction Out-
put Value (IOV) mode in SASSIFI for this step [6], which
injects errors into destination register of the selected in-
struction based on the chosen error model (e.g., single- or
double-bit flip) and bitmask. Only one error is injected
per application run. After error injection, the application
is executed to completion, unless a crash or a hang is
detected. The injection outcomes are categorized based
on the exit status of the application, hang detection,
error messages printed during execution, differences in
stdout/stderr, and program output comparison from that
of the error-free run. Crashes and hangs are categorized
as Arch DUEs, failure symptoms as Potential Arch DUEs,
and stdout or program output differences as SDCs. Runs
with same output as the expected error free output and
no error symptoms are categorized as Masked.
5. COMPOSING IPA AND APA
We compute SDC FIT rate estimate by composing
results from IPA and APA according to Equations 1 for
each of our workloads. We call this estimate SDC TL-
FIT (TL is abbreviation for Two-Level). We use issue
IPC averaged across all the kernels in an application as
the scaling factor (s) in the equation. We obtain it from
issued ipc metric from nvprof [31].
While we cover most of the dynamic instructions (80%
on average as shown in Section 6.2), we do not model
SDC contribution from the remaining instruction types
(not shown in Figure 5). Accounting for such instructions’
implementation-level and architecture-level propagation
will increase the SDC TL-FIT.
We compare the TL-FIT with IPA- and APA-only
estimates. The fraction of dynamic instructions covered
in IPA-only and APA-only evaluations are same as that
covered in our TL-SDC calculations.
Comparison with IPA-only: For the IPA-only ap-
proach, we assume that all architecture-level manifesta-
tions that corrupt instruction output registers will result
in application-level SDCs. We obtain IPA-only results by
using the same equation that we used to obtain TL-FIT,
except that we set pSDCmn = 1 (in Equation 1).
Comparison with APA-only: For the APA-only
approach, we perform uniform architecture-level injec-
tions, which assumes that the particle strikes in unpro-
tected low-level state manifest as single-bit flips in destina-
tion registers of executing instructions uniformly similar
to several prior studies [10, 9, 7]. We obtain APA-only
results by setting the values in the fourth column (single
thread, single register, single bit) in Table 3 to one and
zero out all other values after column two, except for
FFMA and BRA. We set the fifth column value to one
for FFMA. We assume that errors in BRA instructions
will result in DUEs and set the third column value to
one. The APA-only approach estimates the probability of
SDCs per application, not the FIT rate. So we compare
the normalized APA-only results with the TL-FIT rates
mainly for the relative trends.
Comparison with Beam Tests: To evaluate the
accuracy of our model, we beam tested four workloads
to compare the SDC FIT rates with our TL-FIT rates.
We tested heartwall, lavaMD, CoMD, and Lulesh. De-
tails about the experimentation procedure is described in
Section 3.2. For the experiments, we increase the input
size such that the GPU kernel execution is the significant
portion of the total execution time for CoMD, Lulesh,
and heartwall. We consider the kernel time as well as the
time spent in copying memory towards effective execution
time. For lavaMD the fraction of time spent in copying
memory is significant. In these experiments, we consider
any indication of a failure as a DUE. For example, if
we observe a non-zero exit status or an error message in
the system log, which we observe using dmesg utility, we
categorize it as a DUE. In these experiments, whenever
the program output file differs from the fault-free copy
and there is no indication of a failure, we categorize the
run as an SDC.
6. RESULTS
In this section, we quantify how low-level errors mani-
fest at the architecture-level (IPA) and the probability
with which such manifestations propagate to the appli-
cation output (APA). We show a method to compose
these two results to estimate application FIT rates and
compare the results with IPA- and APA-only methods,
as well as to end-to-end beam tests.
6.1 IPA
Table 2 shows the relative FIT rates for different mi-
crobenchmarks (in the second column). We normalize
the results to the FIT rate of IADD microbenchmark.
We show the different events observed during beam tests
(e.g., crashes, hangs, architectural bit-flips) and their
relative rates in columns 3-5. Values in these columns
sum up to the value in column 2 per row, if there is no
rounding error.
Table 2: The architecture-level error manifestation rate
per microbenchmark from our beam testing campaign.
We normalize the results to the total FIT rate of the
IADD microbenchmark.
Bit Type Any F IS
Micro-
benchmark
Relative
FIT
Hangs
&
Crashes
Architectural
bit-flips &
crashes
Architectural
bit-flips
IADD 1 0.71 0.29
FADD 0.8 0.63 0.17
IMAD 0.72 0.47 0.12 0.14
FFMA 0.98 0.69 0.21 0.08
LDS 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.01
ISETP 0.25 0.13 0.13
BRA 0.19 0.17 0.02
Table 3: The architecture-level manifestation rate per
issued instruction for the F-bits. We scale the FIT rates
attributed to F-bits in Table 2 with the target instruc-
tion’s issue rate to obtain FIT rate per issued instruction.
These results are normalized to the per issued instruction
FIT rate of IMAD.
Instruc-
tion
FIT
per
instruc-
tion
per SM
Crashes
Architectural bit-flips
Single register in
single thread
1 reg per
thread
in 2
threads
1 bit 2 bits 3+ bits 3+ bits
IADD 0.7 0.54 0.08 0.08
FADD 0.42 0.08 0.17 0.17
IMAD 1 0.40 0.40 0.20
FFMA 0.69 0.26 0.35 0.09
LDS 0.40 0.20 0.20
ISETP 0.67 0.67
BRA 0.21 0.21
As explained in Section 3.3, we attribute observed
events to the four types of low-level bits. We show the
attribution also in the Table (in the top row). In the third
column, we show failures including hangs and crashes
that happened before GPU kernel started and during the
kernel execution. For some of these events, we were not
able to attribute to any specific type of bit. However,
the majority of these events were due to crashes/hangs
before the GPU kernel execution and we attribute them
to IM-bits. Among all the events that were attributed
to F- and IS-bits, majority of the were architectural
manifestations (as bit-flips in instruction outputs) and
many were due to F-bits. The observation that majority
of the architectural manifestations are attributed to F-bits
suggests the proposed two-level model can be accurate
for application SDC rate estimation.
We next study the distribution of the events attributed
to F-bits. We show the architectural manifestation rate
per issued instruction in Table 3. We scale the FIT rates
presented in the fourth column in Table 2 based on the
instruction issue rate of the target instruction to obtain
the FIT rate per issued instruction, shown in the second
column in Table 3. The rates of different instruction
output-level manifestations are shown in the subsequent
columns. All the values after column 2 in each row
sum up to the value in column 2 if there is no rounding
error. These manifestations are (1) crashes, (2) single
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Figure 5: The fraction of different instruction types in
our workloads.
bit-flips, (3) double bit-flips, and (4) 3+ bit-flips in a
single register in a single thread, and (5) 3+ bit-flips in a
same architectural register in two threads. We later use
the absolute FIT rates (not shown here) while composing
IPA and APA results. Based on these beam test results,
we draw the following conclusions.
• Most of the hangs and crashes in our compute-heavy mi-
crobenchmarks are caused by the I-bits, which indicate
that modeling F-bits alone is insufficient to accurately
estimate the DUE rates even for the compute-heavy
workloads.
• Most of manifestations that flip bits at instruction
output-level are attributed to the F-bits, and these
manifestations corrupt just one register in one or two
threads. (1) This simplifies modeling such manifesta-
tions and quantifying their application-level propaga-
tion probabilities using APA. (2) This also implies that
modeling F-bits alone for compute-heavy workloads
can provide a reasonable SDC FIT rate estimate.
6.2 APA
Instruction Distribution: We plot the percentage
of total dynamic instructions for IADD, FADD, IMAD,
FFMA, LDS, ISETP, and BRA in Figure 5. The results
show that the seven instructions represent up to 80% of
the dynamic instructions (with an average of 49%) for
the workloads. We also plot the percentage of dynamic
instructions that we group together according to the
description in Section 4. The grouping increases the
representation to 80% on average for our workloads.
Architecture-level Error Injections: We conduct
SASSIFI error injection campaigns for CoMD, Lulesh,
and all workloads from the Rodinia benchmark suite using
the error model based on the architectural manifestations
observed in the IPA experiments. Specifically, we inject
errors per instruction type based on Table 3. For the 3+
bit flips in a register (from Table 3) in a single register, we
inject a random value in the destination register. We do
not inject errors that corrupt two threads. We perform
over 115,000 error injection runs, taking approximately
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Figure 6: Masking, DUE, and SDC derating factors for
different error models and opcode groups. Two results
are shown: those averaged across all of our workloads
and the detailed numbers for one application (heartwall).
250 hours on a Tesla K20 GPU. Note that these results
do not change with the GPU, as long as the target ISA
version (e.g., sm 35) is fixed. A summary of the results
averaged across all the workloads is shown in Figure 6.
We do not inject errors in branch instructions because
we observed no events that manifest as bit-flips at the
architecture-level state.
This figure, as well as the detailed per-application re-
sults (we only show heartwall here for brevity) show that
injecting single and double bit flips into destination reg-
isters results in similar outcomes. We note that injecting
random value errors, however, often produces different
outcome distribution. Hence, it is important to know
what proportion of particle strikes that manifest as 3+
bit flips in the instruction outputs. The detailed per
application results show that the errors in destination
registers in different instruction types behave differently.
Based on these results, we draw the following conclusions,
which suggest that APA is a necessary step in estimating
application SDCs.
• Propagation of architecture-level error depends heavily
on the application, necessitating application-specific
analysis.
• Error propagation probabilities depend heavily on in-
struction type within an application.
• Error propagation probabilities depend on bit-flip model
for a given instruction type.
6.3 SDC Rates When Composing IPA and APA
We compute SDC TL-FIT rate by composing results
Table 4: Average instruction issue rate for our workloads.
Workload
Issue
IPC
Workload
Issue
IPC
Workload
Issue
IPC
pathfinder 2.45 nw 0.51 nn 1.26
mummergpu 1.76 kmeans 0.78 hotspot 3.49
gaussian 0.75 bfs 1.27 heartwall 1.88
srad v1 1.69 lud 0.13 srad v2 2.61
backprop 1.56 lavaMD 3.85 streamcluster 0.75
b+tree 1.40 CoMD 2.81 Lulesh 1.62
from IPA and APA as described in Section 5 and Equa-
tions 1. We show issue IPCs (scaling factor) in Table 4.
High issue IPC for a workload implies that the it is able
to keep the GPU pipelines busy and a high potential for
high TL-SDC.
SDC TL-FIT rates computed using our method are
shown in Figure 7 for different applications, normalized
to the SDC TL-FIT rate of hotspot. We observe that
either low APA SDC probabilities or issue IPC implies
that the SDC TL-FIT will be low. Results show that lud,
backprop, streamcluster, and Lulesh have low SDC TL-
FIT rates and they all have low APA SDC probabilities.
Hotspot and srad v2 are the two applications with the
highest SDC TL-FIT rates and they both have high
APA SDC probabilities and average issue IPC. We next
compare our results with two approaches that either do
not consider IPA or APA and explain the differences. We
call them APA-only and IPA-only, respectively.
Comparison with IPA-only: IPA-only approach
conservatively assumes that all architecture-level mani-
festations will result in application-level SDCs. We show
the results in Figure 7, which are normalized to the TL-
FIT of hotspot. As expected, the results show that the
IPA-only FIT rates are always higher than TL-FIT rates.
They are, in fact, >10x higher for six of our workloads.
The IPA-only results also show significantly differences in
the trends compared to TL-FIT. For the workloads with
low APA-only SDC probabilities, the difference between
the TL-FIT and IPA-only FIT rates are higher. These
results highlight the importance of performing IPA to
quantify the architecture-level error manifestation rates
and APA to quantify the application-level error propaga-
tion probabilities.
Comparison with APA-only: The APA-only ap-
proach performs uniform architecture-level injections,
similar to many prior studies [10, 9, 7]. It estimates the
probability of SDCs per application given an architecture-
level error, not the FIT rate, making it difficulty to di-
rectly compare with SDC TL-FIT. We however compare
the normalized SDC probabilities in Figure 7. We nor-
malize the applications’ SDC probabilities to the highest
observed SDC probability (0.43 for srad v2).
The results show significant differences in the trends
compared to TL-FIT. For example, the top two SDC-
vulnerable applications according to APA-only results
have similar SDC probabilities, whereas the TL-FIT rates
show a difference of nearly 1.5x. Two of the top five SDC-
vulnerable applications are different when selected using
the two evaluation techniques. Primary reasons for these
differences are the following. (1) The TL-FIT uses abso-
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Figure 7: Relative SDC FIT rate estimates (TL-FIT)
for the F-bits obtained using our compositional model.
The results are normalized to the SDC TL-FIT rate of
hotspot. We also show APA-only SDC probabilities and
IPA-only SDC FIT rates here for comparison, which are
normalized to the APA-only SDC probability of srad v2
and the TL-FIT of hotspot, respectively.
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Figure 8: Comparing application SDC FIT rates obtained
from direct beam tests with our TL-FIT rate estimates.
SDC rates are normalized to the 95% confidence upper
limit of Lulesh’s SDC FIT rates.
lute rate of architecture-level manifestations and does not
rely on the accuracy of DUE estimates. The APA-only
approach, however, requires the relative DUE probabili-
ties to be accurate to estimate relative SDC probabilities.
(2) The APA-only approach does not consider the relative
vulnerabilities of different instructions and rates of dif-
ferent architecture-level manifestations. Our findings are
inline with one of the prior studies (conducted on CPUs)
which also showed that high-level error propagation anal-
ysis alone may be highly inaccurate when compared to
studies that model errors at low-level using FPGA- or
RTL-based simulators [3].
Comparison with Beam Tests: We compare SDC
TL-FIT with the SDC FIT rate obtained by beam testing
four workloads. The results are shown in Figure 8, which
are normalized to the 95% confidence upper limit of the
SDC rate of lavaMD. Results show that the SDC TL-
FIT rates are close to the beam test results and are
within the confidence intervals. While the error bar from
beam test measurement for Lulesh is high, we expect
the SDC FIT to be low (close to 0) based on several
prior studies which show that only a small fraction of
low-level errors propagate to the Lulesh’s output [32,
33, 34]. Our APA results also show that only a small
percentage of architectural manifestations propagate to
the output, which also suggests that the SDC FIT for this
application should be small compared to other workloads.
A prior study showed that CoMD is significantly more
susceptible than Lulesh [32]. Our SDC TL-FIT results
also show the same trend.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Applications
Understanding Application Resilience: Identi-
fying application characteristics that correlate well with
either SDCs or DUEs is an interesting application. For
example, certain programming constructs or design pat-
terns may be associated with greater error propagation.
Identification of those constructs or patterns would al-
low programmers to adjust their application code for
higher reliability. This would also aid the development
of libraries that have higher resilience, which can be
substituted based on the error rate and overhead targets.
We inspected CUDA and SASS code of two workloads
with highest SDC TL-FIT (hotspot and srad v2), and one
with least SDC TL-FIT (lud). For hotspot and srad v2,
only a small fraction of SASS instructions are used for
control and address computation, whereas the fraction of
instructions used for address computation is high for lud.
These observations along with the results presented in
Figure 7 indicate that whenever the fraction of instruc-
tions used for control and address computation is high,
the likelihood of DUEs is also high in APA. Interestingly,
prior studies have also made similar observations [35,
10]. Address randomization can be used to increase the
likelihood of DUEs in the APA step.
Deciding Which Workloads Need Protection:
The presented approach can be directly employed to
decide which workloads need protection. For example,
for an HPC system with large number of GPUs and
a mean-time-to-SDC target that is usually in weeks or
months, a per GPU target SDC FIT rate can be derived.
This limit can be placed on Figure 7 to select applications
that exceed the SDC target. As an example, with the
per-GPU SDC target of 0.5 in Figure 7, we would select
hotspot and srad v2 for protection.
Our approach can also be used to identify highly vul-
nerable kernels within an application to enable selec-
tive software-implemented error detection and correction
methods [36, 37, 20] for cost-effective protection.
7.2 Accounting for bit-flips in IS- and V-bits
Our IPA results (Section 6.1) show that a small fraction
of architecture-level bit-flip manifestations are attributed
to IS-bits. These manifestations corrupt registers in mul-
tiple threads in one or two warps (categories 5-8 in Sec-
tion 3.3). By definition, the rate of such manifestations
is device- and application dependent. Predicting these
rates using existing performance counters is an interesting
research direction. Based on our experimental data, we
find inverse correlations with two performance metrics
stall inst fetch and issue slot utilization, as reported by
nvprof [31]. The correlation coefficients are -0.97 and
-0.58, respectively. Developing a model to predict such
manifestations would require more experiments and val-
idation. Our APA methodology is capable of injecting
these architecture-level manifestations.
The contribution of V-bits can become dominant for
instructions that stress the memory subsystem (global
memory loads/stores). Bit-flips in unprotected structures
in the memory subsystem can propagate as bit-flips into
a cache or memory line. Such a errors can corrupt a
single or multiple instructions depending on the reuse
characteristic of the line. We conducted IPA (beam)
experiments using two microbenchmarks of load instruc-
tion that always hit and miss in L2 cache, respectively,
stressing the memory subsystem in different ways. We
observed higher crash/hang rate compared to the tests
that focus on exercising F-bits. Interestingly, we only
observed single bit flips in the destination registers of one
instruction. Since the memory subsystem of GPUs has
several layers of buffers, more experiments are needed
to accurately model contribution of V-bits. A simulator
that models some of the major unprotected buffers in the
memory subsystem (e.g., SASSIFI with a detailed cache
model) may be better suited to perform IPA.
7.3 Other Considerations
Our approach, as presented in the paper, is a post-
silicon estimation technique because IPA and APA ex-
periments are performed on production devices. This
approach can potentially be used to estimate FIT rates
of future generation GPUs by (1) scaling and extrapo-
lating IPA results based on technology and architectural
changes and (2) replacing the IPA and APA experiments
with low-level pre-silicon simulation-based approaches. A
prior study employed Register Transfer- and Gate-level
error simulations in an out-of-order processor to quantify
how low-level errors propagate to the instruction-level [2].
While this method provides high control in performing
IPA, the paper focused on limited microarchitecture-level
units (e.g., the scheduler and ROB). Employing such
a method to more low-level units, as permitted by the
available engineering resources, can be used to perform
pre-silicon IPA.
We do not consider multiple-bit faults induced by par-
ticle strikes in ECC protected SRAM structures in our
model because they can be converted into correctable
events with an appropriate level of bit-interleaving.
Several field studies have been performed on large-
scale HPC installations with thousands of GPUs [38, 39].
These studies measure the frequency of interrupts caused
by GPU errors to estimate raw error and DUE rates, but
not the SDC rates. Such studies are complementary to
the two-level as we focus on SDC rate estimation.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new two-level methodology to
estimate SDC rates of applications running on production
GPUs. Our approach first quantifies how particle strikes
in low-level unprotected state manifest at the architecture-
level through accelerated beam experiments. We then
perform near-silicon-speed architecture-level error injec-
tions to quantify how such manifestations propagate to
the program output. Composing these two steps, which
we call IPA (implementation-level analysis) and APA
(architecture-level analysis), respectively, we estimated
SDC rates for the workloads from Rodinia benchmark
suite and two DOE mini-apps. This two-level approach
allows us to estimate SDC rate of any application by per-
forming just the APA, once the IPA is performed. IPA
needs to be performed just once per GPU generation.
We compare our SDC rate estimates with accelerated
beam test results for four of our workloads and find them
to be close. We also compare our results with two other
approaches that either perform just the IPA or APA.
Results show that ignoring either IPA or APA often
overestimates SDC rates and show significantly different
trends—the composition of the two is needed for accurate
reliability modeling.
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